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Abstract 
 
Normative studies misunderstand a crucial aspect of cannabis legalization: they 
have not critically analyzed how the pharmaceutical industry might react when synthetic 
cannabinoid compounds could be incorporated into new products. I argue that when 
marijuana is federally legal, there will be two independent market developments in: i) the 
cannabis market, which includes botanic cannabis and herbal supplements sold in retail 
nutrition stores; and ii) the FDA-approved ethical drug market. How does the drug 
industry’s monopolistic pricing structure lend itself to strategic pricing for these new 
synthetic cannabinoids? How much competition can we expect between dispensaries and 
nutrition shops selling herbal supplements? This work seeks to answer these questions by 
reviewing the literature on pricing and marketing strategies. I find that supplements’ 
pricing strategies are based on production costs and retail shops’ degree of market power. 
Prices for over-the-counter herbal supplements will follow a medium-low price to low 
price skimming trajectory. From a policy perspective, health insurers may cover these 
drugs in future drug plans. Synthetic cannabinoids may also be a breakthrough in the 
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 Chapter I: A Tale of Two Markets  
Marijuana has been called many things: weed, pot, reefer, grass, and for some, 
medicine. It has been used as an herbal remedy dating back to ancient China. In the 20th 
century United States, was seen as a dangerous psychoactive drug deserving of strict 
prohibition. Some argue that the costs of carcinogenic smoke and toxic gases outweigh its 
therapeutic benefits. Studies support the medical effects, but they are not unanimous.  
In recent decades, federal cannabis legalization has slowly gained momentum 
Marijuana has been on a strange trip from toleration, to abandonment, marginalization, 
acceptance, and soon, capitalization. The timeline below shows the progression in the 
liberalization of marijuana. In recent years, public interest in marijuana has hit an all-
time-high. In the most recent Pew Research poll, 57% of Americans believe marijuana 
should be legal; 71% of Millennials, 57% of Generation X and 56% of the Baby Boomer 
Generation support of legalization (Pew Research Center 2016). Public interest is putting 
pressure on the U.S. Government to make efforts to legalize or decriminalize cannabis. 
The following timeline marks the milestones in federal marijuana liberalization policy: 
1970: The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 makes marijuana a Schedule I drug, 
declaring it as dangerous as peyote (mescaline), Ecstasy (MDMA), or heroin. 
Legally, it holds no medical purpose and is more addictive and less 





2001: The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) rules that there is no 
distinction between recreational and medical marijuana under California’s 
Compassionate Use Act. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 precludes the 
use of cannabis as a medical defense. However, the SCOTUS also determines that 
states are entitled to medical marijuana programs insofar as it pertains to their 
10th Constitutional Amendment Right. SCOTUS determines that California may 
serve as a “social laboratory” for future marijuana laws. (United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative). 
2003: The U.S. Patent Office grants a patent on marijuana to the U.S. Department 
of Health and Huma Services to suggest it may be useful in treating Alzheimer’s. 
(U.S. 6,630,507: 2003) It was the U.S. government’s first recognition since 1937 
that cannabis may have a medical use. 
2009: The Department of Justice (DOJ) sends a memo to Attorney Generals 
across the country, recommending that they not prosecute medical marijuana 
patients who were in ‘clear and unambiguous’ compliance with state law 
(Campbell 2012: 34). 
2013: The DOJ releases another memorandum. This one is similar to the 2009 
memo, but its focus is on preventing the growth of illegitimate commercial 
enterprises and the exacerbation of public health issues associated with states’ 
cannabis laws. (Cole 2013). 
2014: A New Mexico court rules that workmen's compensation must pay for a 




medical cannabis program. Citing the 2013 DOJ memo, the presiding appellate 
judge ruled that the reimbursement of medical cannabis does not violate federal 
public policy (Vialpando v. Ben’s Automotive Services and Redwood Fire & 
Casualty).  
2015: Two separate bills are introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives, 
which would federally legalize marijuana, remove it as a Schedule I drug, tax and 
regulate it. It would not, however, require states to legalize it if they chose not to 
(Ferner 2015). As the time of this writing, the bill is stalled. 
2016: The Supreme Court denies hearing a lawsuit case against Colorado. The 
plaintiffs in Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado argued that Colorado’s 
legalized marijuana market put a strain on their states’ criminal justice resources. 
Legal experts postulate that the Court denied hearing the case since they had 
previously ruled on Congress’ authority to regulate cannabis in interstate 
commerce.  
2016: The DEA decides that it will not reschedule cannabis from its current 
Schedule I status, but it will increase access to the plant for scientific research 
purposes—not for commercial development (Department of Justice 2016). 
 It is quite possible that we could see marijuana legalized within our lifetime. A 
majority of Americans believe that marijuana should be outright legalized to allow for 
federal taxation and regulation. Many economic studies argue for this level of 
legalization, but it is not clear what happens after the fact. These milestones reflect that 




health care system. However, most insurance companies are strongly opposed to covering 
patients’ dispensary purchases, regardless of whether marijuana is federally legal or not. 
There is precedent for it, but it is rare (Hermes in Vande Panne 2013).  
When legalized, how might drug companies react? So far the conversation about 
legalizing cannabis has largely ignored their incentives to lobby against marijuana—and 
the incentives they have in developing their own synthetic cannabinoid drugs. From my 
perspective, we have been talking about why marijuana should be legalized, but neglect 
to see why it will not (yet): U.S. drug companies must have a clinical alternative to offer 
patients in the market for pharmaceuticals in order to ensure that they remain loyal 
customers. Otherwise, patients may leave the drug market when cannabis is more 
accessible, and drug companies would lose profits. 
Furthermore, what kinds of new drug products might they create, and what will 
pricing structures look like? In this work, I address this perspective. Specifically, how 
might Big Pharma react if forthcoming marijuana research results in synthetic 
cannabinoid compounds that are available to create new products? Beyond that, how does 
the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing structure lend itself to strategic pricing for new 
synthetic cannabinoids? Marijuana legalization would not resolve advocates’ fight to 
make the Cannabis Sativa L. plant and all of its derivatives (oil, hemp, etc.) FDA-
approved medicine. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not approve plant 
material as methods of dispensing in prescription drugs (Sabet 2012).  
Advocates argue that Big Pharma lobbies against legalization because if cannabis 




would lose large sums of profits. This is true insofar as the industry is not yet ready to 
enter into the cannabis industry. We assume here that the research that would result from 
the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) decision to reschedule marijuana might 
eventually result in new, better cannabinoid drugs. Big Pharma is lobbying against pot’s 
legalization until it has enough research to get better, more effective drugs in the 
pipeline—ones that could be a safer alternative to highly scrutinized opioid medications. 
It is highly unlikely that the federal U.S. government will move toward a full-
scale legalization of the cash crop. I suspect that legalization might unfold incrementally 
in order to allow drug companies time to develop successfully new drug offerings. 
Specifically, legalization should first include legislation to make an exception to 
cannabis’s possession for scientific research. If profitable, drug companies would no 
longer have an incentive to lobby against marijuana. This would allow drug development 
without making supplements and cannabis legal. After that, legalization for medical use 
would be possible, followed by taxation and regulation of adult recreational cannabis. 
If marijuana were to become legal in this context, drug companies would have 
created synthetic marijuana products to market in the FDA-approved ethical drug market. 
This is the market in which behind the counter or “legend” drugs and their generic 
equivalents are sold. These would include synthesized therapeutic versions of those found 
in the cannabis plant; of these, the most sought-after will be cannabidiol (CBD, the 
healing component). Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the psychoactive component) may also 




producing lab-manufactured synthetics to make them unique and distinct from any 
generic oil supplement or botanic strain.  
Scientists might uncover as-of-now unknown compounds. They could create a 
more complete profile of marijuana’s chemical structure and understand more fully the 
interaction(s) of those chemicals.  
It is postulated that the beneficial therapeutic effects of cannabis result from the 
interaction of different cannabinoids and other compounds present in the plant 
Cannabis sativa L. This may explain why cannabis-based medicines made from 
whole plant extracts may be more effective than single cannabinoid products [like 
Marinol or Syndros] (Stott 2004: 85). 
  
This work begins with this hypothesis: if marijuana were legalized for scientific research 
purposes, drug companies would be able to develop these new and improved cannabinoid 
drugs. The question is, Assuming that these products are scientifically possible, what 
might pricing strategies look like? 
The purpose of this work is an attempt to analyze qualitatively market 
developments in the cross-section of the pharmaceutical and legal marijuana industries. 
By defining the market boundaries, we can determine launch prices for new synthetic 
cannabinoid pharmaceuticals and OTC herbal supplements. Other important factors are 
the demand determinants for the products in these markets (income, preferences, etc.). 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the supply side of bringing drugs to market.   
In the real world, how drug companies might organize themselves in terms of 
pricing decisions and market power depends on working relationships with insurers and 
other drug companies. Prices are not created in a vacuum; they depend on the industrial 




and supply, development and promotional costs, patent positioning (and laws regarding 
such), market power, technical capacity and abilities, and many more (Weston in Chien 
1979: 75) These factors create the environment and determine how these companies will 
operate. This is known as the structure-conduct-performance model that encompasses 
modern industrial economic theory. Please note that the drug company-drug insurer 
dynamic presents some out-of-scope considerations. However, I will comment on it in 
my concluding remarks. 
The Market Segmentation Model 
Companies act as competing monopolists, as described in Chapter III. They 
attempt to segment the market into brand loyal customers to gain market share. 
Advertising attempts to ensure that a customer will not buy the competitor’s product. 
This keeps the different customers that firms sell to independent, limiting the opportunity 
for “arbitrage” in different markets. It determines monopolists’ level of second-degree 
price discrimination. Drug companies do not launch a single price for the industry, but 
many: high prices for patients with higher levels of willingness-to-pay, and low prices or 
free to low-income patients receiving public health care, i.e. Medicaid. “Payers that use 
economic considerations may receive low prices if this is required in order to 
demonstrate economic attractiveness. Thus, pharmaceutical manufacturers may be 
required to set several different prices” (Zaric 2008: 1278). Normally in this second-
degree price discrimination, producers will offer different sets of customers a lower price 
for greater quantities purchased. Firms initially have no method to discern which 




Varian (1996) says, by changing the quality of the product. Those with a lower 
willingness to pay, or “low demand”, will self-select themselves to choose the product 
with a lower quality at a lower price. The same is true for the high demand customer. “If 
the producer cannot precisely identify the users, it may want to adjust the characteristics 
of the good being sold so that users self-select the product targeted for them (Varian 5: 
1996, italics in original).” Likewise, in the market for brand-name and generic drugs,  
Many studies trace price rigidity of patent-expired drugs to consumers’ price 
insensitivity toward brand-name drugs. When a market is segmented between the 
price-sensitive consumers who adopt the generic and the price-insensitive 
consumers who continue to use the brand-name drug, the brand-name drug firm 
can raise its price optimally to its captive or price-insensitive clients and simply 
ignore the price-sensitive business siphoned off by its generic competitors (Hong 
et al 2005: 747).  
 
There could be at least three versions of cannabis-based products in the product 
space. Drug companies are then able to isolate the customers willing to pay for 
convenience and better quality of care. Customers self-select themselves into either the 
ethical drug market or into the market for cannabis, depending on the price that they are 
willing to pay for an improved quality of cannabis that they wish to consume. As the 
quality of these products decreases, so too does the price. These potential products are: 
1. FDA-approved prescription cannabinoid drugs 
2. Botanic cannabis (phytocannabinoids) 
3. Generic over-the-counter (OTC) cannabis health supplements 
Following from this, we could expect to see two distinct market developments within the 




patients with a ‘preference’ for natural medicine purchase health care through home 
remedies, dietary supplements and naturopathic medicines, including botanic cannabis.  
 To be clear, I argue that people will choose one of three products to consume, and 
products are differentiated with respect to quality. In fact, it is actually a determinant of 
product choice. A preference for higher quality, matched with a willingness to pay for it, 
would place the customer into one of three markets for these products.   
Although product with respect to quality is itself a form of product differentiation, 
the two can be discussed separately. A quality differentiation is a product decision based 
on a preference for a higher grade or standard of excellence among products. This is 
typically reflected in each product’s price. Between ethical drugs and OTC health 
supplements, the former has a stricter regulatory process to ensure more quality control 
than a health supplement. In Chapter IV, I compare and contrast the two in further detail.  
 On the other hand, product differentiation is a product decision based on the 
characteristics among competing goods. One prescription drug may come in a liquid form 
while another is encapsulated. One drug may be more effective in alleviating head trauma 
while the other is intended to treat nerve pain, or each may come with different side 
effects. Varying product characteristics, and patients’ preferences for them, are factors 
that create brand-loyalty in competing drug products; price competition plays a minor 
role in this product decision (Frank & Salkever 1992). In our model, when discussing 
pharmaceuticals in Chapter III, we are really talking about product differentiation. When 




Below, I define the border between these two markets. This will allow us to 
review the pricing decisions of pharmaceuticals separately from that of herbal 
supplements. Herbal supplements and cannabis offer an alternative to ethical drugs; 
cannabinoids themselves compete with opioids, for example. The two markets do not 
compete directly, but instead customers self-select themselves into either market, 
depending on their preferences and ability to pay for higher quality medicine. We further 
assume that patients are aware of the level of quality they are receiving based on how 
much they are willing and able to pay for it. 
Figure 1 below depicts this product space. There are two large sectors in the 
marijuana industry. On one side is the ethical drug industry. In particular, it would 
include marijuana pharmaceuticals: both cannabis-based and -derived drugs, marketed as 
an alternative competing drug products. The other industry is divided between nutrition 
shops and apothecaries selling ‘generic’ herbal supplements one the one side, and 
dispensaries ‘specializing’ in botanic cannabis in the other submarket. Patients may see 
cannabis and generic supplements with some degree of substitution. Therefore, while the 
division between the market for ethical drugs and that of the cannabis is ‘sealed off’, the 
same may not be true for the division between the cannabis and dietary supplements 
submarkets. This explains why the border between these two is open. As Stigler explains: 
An industry should embrace the maximum geographical area and the maximum 
variety of productive activities in which there is a strong long-run substitution. If 
buyers can shift on a large scale from product or area B to A, then the two should 
be combined. If producers can shift on a large scale from B to A, again they 






















For example, consider the story of Marinol (dronabinol). The drug is used 
primarily in chemotherapy patients to treat nausea and vomiting. It is composed of 
approximately 99% tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), one of the core healing compounds in 
traditional marijuana, and sesame seed oil. Marinol is made using a process to isolate and 
chemically rebuild the THC compound. It received its patent in 1986, but not before the 
DEA had to reschedule synthetic THC—not marijuana proper—to a Schedule III, making 
it legal for medical purposes and further research. 
The drug, however, was not widely accepted, even after its indications (the on-
label intended uses for a drug) were expanded to include appetite stimulation in AIDS 
patients (Stott 2004: 87), resulting in a new drug, Syndros. One reason for this is that 
patients found it to be far less effective than smoked cannabis. Patients preferred cannabis 





















inferior to cannabis. Customers then moved through the product space, and settled in 
cannabis submarket, where they remained. At the time, had drug companies patented a 
substitute cannabinoid similar enough to cannabis and better than Marinol’s recipe, 
patients would have remained in the ethical drug market. Patients will leave this market if 
there continues to be a lack of alternatives available in it.  
A preference for a certain quality and the ability to pay for it also tells us why a 
patient would choose to take a prescription cannabinoid when botanic cannabis is 
available. As Varian (1996) concludes, customers may pay a higher price to avoid an 
inconvenience, or to reduce the restrictions on the use of their product. Examples include: 
paying extra to use the express lane on the highway, paying a penalty for the freedom to 
break an apartment lease before it expires, or paying for priority seating on an airline (as 
in Varian (1996)). We can see that in these new drug developments, where patients face a 
cash purchase of either cannabis or cannabinoids, the latter is targeted at patients who 
appreciate the quality, accessibility, and convenience of using cannabis where it is 
otherwise prohibited in its botanic form. Most states that have legalized or decriminalized 
marijuana have also banned smoking in public. The convenience of a controlled 
medicinal substance would be a benefit—as is avoiding the inconvenience of a penalty 
for smoking in a prohibited area. The same is true in states that choose not to legalize or 
decriminalize cannabis entirely.  
Naturally, one target market for these synthetics could be hospitals and inpatient 
care—where smoking/inhalation is prohibited, and an injection or an intravenous solution 




resulting from chemotherapy. Specialized cannabinoids might even provide a safer 
alternative to chemotherapy! Similarly, for out-patient care, consider patients who are 
against cannabis for ethical reasons and cannot or will not smoke it. A pharmaceutical 
pill, spray, or other mode would be regarded as more legitimate if a physician prescribes 
it to them. It also would allow a person to take their medication in public.  
This highlights a second reason: there may be people who need to take a 
pharmaceutical cannabinoid for employment reasons. Consider an employee who must 
take cannabis in their health regimen, even at the risk of losing their job. If this employee 
instead had an FDA-approved drug, they would pass a drug screening with a doctor’s 
prescription and keep their job. This is no different from any other prescription. 
Third, cannabinoids’ ability to isolate the healing compounds in cannabis, CBD 
and THC, means that other minor chemicals are not present. A person can avoid the 
carcinogens from smoking. An ethical drug is more sterile, thereby providing a more 
valuable health product. Drug makers could potentially provide a more efficient product, 
without side effects associated with other treatments, like a low risk of addiction. This 
proved to be an effective selling point for OxyContin even if it was blatantly false. 
Cannabinoids vs. Opioids 
It is a sufficient assumption that if marijuana were rescheduled to a Schedule II, 
drug companies would work to bring these synthetic marijuana products to market. If this 
policy change were a necessary condition, then opioids would not be on the market. 




So the question is, if heroin was a limited impediment for opioid drug development, why 
should we expect that it is a strict impediment for cannabinoids? 
The divergence in outcomes between the two depends in part on its history and 
stigmas associated with each. In short, opioids already had a legitimate accepted medical 
use long before heroin was outlawed. Morphine (1804), codeine (1832), heroin (1874), 
and hydrocodone (1920) had all been synthesized before the Controlled Substances Act 
of 1970 (Narconon.org 2017). Morphine especially had already proven useful in wartime 
as an effective painkiller. The 1924 Opium Prohibition Act made the importation, 
manufacture, and/or possession of heroin and opium illegal, but the Act made an 
exception for medical use (Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 1922; Opium 
Prohibition Importation Act, 1924). The availability of these compounds would facilitate 
R&D to make stronger painkillers like Percocet (oxycodone) and Vicodin (hydrocodone 
and acetaminophen). Consequently, the opium plant from which these drugs are derived 
is available as Schedule II drug.  
Conversely, the Marihuana Tax Act (1937) placed a tax on the commercial sale of 
cannabis, including medical use. THC was not synthesized until 1964. Unlike heroin, it 
would be another 20 years before it was offered in a pharmaceutical product—and an 
impossible 6 year time window to get it to market before marijuana became federally 
illegal; The 1970 Controlled Substances Act effectively made the 1937 Act null and void. 
Only synthetic THC is available for developing cannabinoids, and its botanical origin is 
restricted in the United States. In the United Kingdom, it is available for scientific 




future pharmaceutical products. Permission to research cannabis in the U.K. would 
eventually give British drug companies to develop better synthetic cannabinoids 
(discussed below). Therefore, increasing access to cannabis, through legalization that 
makes an exception for medical research or other means, is long overdue. 
Outline 
The thesis is summarized as follows. Chapter II describes the motivations for 
pharmaceutical companies to develop a synthetic cannabinoid. What are the market 
incentives, and how do the medical facts on marijuana translate into a marketable 
product? Chapter II also provides supporting evidence for the economic rationale of 
segmentation of consumer preferences illustrated in Figure 1. The information about 
marijuana in general provided in this chapter will be useful for understanding conclusions 
reached in the following ones. Chapter III serves a critical and dual purpose: it provides a 
thorough review of the literature on pricing strategies within the competitive monopoly 
framework. By drawing on some core features of these strategies, and combining this 
information with marijuana drug development, we can speculate on launch prices and 
trends for new cannabinoids. Chapter IV follows a similar procedure to describe the 
marketing strategies for marijuana herbal supplements and resulting prices. Finally, 
Chapter V summarizes and concludes. It offers insights into policy implications, namely, 
the potential for health insurance companies to cover these drugs in their health plans; 
pressures on drug companies to support marijuana legalization; and the opportunity for 







Chapter II: Marijuana in the Marketplace 
Until now, we have looked at the theoretical foundations for the present study. 
The last chapter provided some justifications for dividing the cannabis market. This 
chapter offers some concrete examples of types of products that might be offered, and 
how they might be marketed. It will also describe Big Pharma’s incentives to create these 
drugs. If scientists and pharmacists could find a way to harness the healing powers of 
cannabis in a way that conforms to modern medical practices, they could effectively 
create an entire new product line to treat a myriad of health problems.  
A drug’s potential a ‘blockbuster’ relies on claims about its efficacy, advantage 
over other drugs, the diseases it can treat, and any unique properties about the new 
chemical under development. In an economic sense, firms essentially have the 
opportunity to claim a competitive advantage:  
[f]or a pharmaceutical to be a commercial success, it must be well protected in 
terms of Intellectual Property Rights…there must be a clinical need for the 
product. It has been demonstrated that [for] certain 
diseases/conditions…cannabinoids provide additional relief to patients where all 
existing products currently available have failed (Stott 2004: 85, italics added). 
  
The goal for drug companies is to reproduce the effects of cannabis in a synthetic form, 
package it, patent it, and market it. If a company claims that its product’s therapeutic 
benefits surpass any other on the market, this marketing strategy may lead to a higher 
price it higher above its competitors, yielding a significant return on its investment (Lu & 




serves as an in depth review of these practices. Next, I will outline the possibilities for 
synthetic cannabis, in the event that it is offered as a pharmaceutical product. This 
includes current offerings and R&D for products in the ‘drug pipeline’, and room for 
improvement in future drugs. I will also put this into context by contrasting it with 
heroin-based opioids. 
Synthetic Cannabinoids 
Before we can look at how drug companies might react, we must answer why they 
would want to invest in synthetic marijuana-derived drugs. To name a few incentives: 
(the exclusion of) competition and capturing market share, gaining new patents and 
extending old ones, innovation to keep a competitive advantage, and rising shareholder 
value, which funds financial capital for continuing R&D. 
These motivations would eventually lead them to produce a drug that includes 
minor chemicals in addition to THC and CBD, not just those isolated chemicals. Drug 
companies could patent a product or process that improves upon Marinol or Syndros 
(whose developments also led to the invention of another antiemetic, Cesamet 
(nabilone)). “It is possible that the development of novel synthetic agents with more 
specific actions and fewer side-effects will extend [synthetic cannabis’s] therapeutic 
range” (Ashton 1999: 122). Drug companies could develop more products to treat more 
people, capitalizing upon a huge market opportunity.  
In some clinical trials, patients preferred Cesamet (nabilone) to other drugs to 
treat cancerous pain. It did not depend simply on consumer preference of pharmaceutical 




compared to traditional drugs—even in children (di Marzo & de Petrocellis 2006: 557). 
This evidence, though not unanimous, suggests that a maker of an effective cannabinoid 
could be more competitive than Marinol, Syndros, Cesamet, or other opioids like 
Vicodin. Additionally, the FDA has officially recognized that THC can be used to treat 
eating disorders like wasting syndrome, and quelling vomiting and nausea during 
chemotherapy. Future drugs could treat glaucoma, reverse cancer, treat Multiple 
Sclerosis, and dramatically expand the range of symptoms that these drugs treat.  
Making these cannabinoids is not a new venture for drug companies. A few drugs 
utilize them; Sativex and Marinol are the most well-known. The former is ‘liquefied 
marijuana’, and the latter is an FDA-approved, lab-manufactured synthetic. Sativex is in 
Phase III clinical trials, the final stage before a market launch. Barring federal prohibition 
on marijuana, Sativex is set to be the first cannabis-derived medication in the U.S. GW 
pharmaceuticals, a London-based company, patented Sativex. They also make Epidiolex, 
a pure liquid CBD, used in the treatment of epilepsy. GW is the leader in marijuana-
based medicine, but they have not yet broken into U.S. markets; larger companies like 
Pfizer show no signs of taking similar initiatives just yet. However, nearly a decade ago, 
five of the world’s top ten drug companies were developing 18 cannabinoid-related 
compounds. Plans have since been aborted (ProCon.org 2013). 
Sativex treats Multiple Sclerosis. It is not a synthetic, but an oral spray and 
derived directly from cannabis. It has been found to be extremely effective, with minimal 
adverse effects, even in patients without the disease. Patients in the study even responded 




In another study, Sativex was assigned a Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) of 0.15 
over 5 years (Lu et al 2012). This serves as an example to show how companies are 
improving on the original Marinol product, giving way to new innovations, new 
investment opportunities, and competition. One of the reasons that U.S. drug companies 
are hesitant to invest in these drugs is because of the international competition from GW. 
Currently, Big Pharma is essentially protectionist: it sees marijuana (and cannabis 
supplements) as a threat to their profits on opioids. There is a significant risk in 
supporting full-scale marijuana legalization and then ‘racing’ to get a cannabinoid to 
market. They are cautiously optimistic about cannabinoid drug development, but there is 
less risk in seeing how GW’s products fare before divesting from opioids. 
Table 1 lists companies who have developed a cannabinoid, successful or not. 
Companies Developing Synthetic Cannabinoids 
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Cannabis Sciences CS-S/BCC-1 Oncology Preclinical trials 
Table 1: Adapted from Mintz et al. (2015: 21-22) & ProCon.org (2013) 
Suppose researchers discovered an exotic new plant with naturopathic benefits 
greater than or equal to marijuana. Drug companies would be highly interested in 
developing this in a new drug product, and because it does not have the same (legal or 
ethical) history that marijuana does, there would be no restrictions on its import to the 
United States, or possession of it in general. Companies could conduct R&D on this new 
plant’s biologic properties in Phase I clinical trials. This Phase test the drug on small 
groups of human subjects. If there are no serious side effects or if the drug is reasonably 
toxic, it would move to Phase II. This Phase still monitors for safety, but the drug is 
tested for its effectiveness: is it effective in treating the on-label disease or condition? If it 
showed that the drug is not safe and effective or had side effects like severe hallucination 
on par with a drug like peyote (mescaline), the drug would not proceed to Phase III, 
which ends in marketing.  
There are ten drugs listed in Table 1, and more than half of them have failed. Only 
40% were approved for marketing: Marinol, Cesamet, Sativex, Epidiolex. At higher 
doses, the other 60% showed increased risks of complications, the CBD or THC was not 
pure enough, or did not show significant improvement in quality standards to advance to 
the next stage of testing. This small sample statistic is not far from the average. Gladin 




the industry has to rely on 30% of products to fully recover out-of-pocket expenses, the 
cost of all failures, and the cost of capital (DiMasi, 2001)” (12). The problem that plagues 
failed cannabinoid developments seems to be part of a general trend found in the ethical 
drug industry as a whole.  
The FDA is not opposed to marijuana drug development, expanding research, or 
approving botanic-derived drugs in general. The U.S. government even holds a patent on 
marijuana. Patent No. 6,630,507 is the U.S. government’s recognition that certain 
compounds in cannabis may be useful in treating complications in degenerative brain 
diseases like Alzheimer’s or cirrhosis; it is not a claim on the plant itself. Though 
contradictory to the DEA’s claim that marijuana has no medical use, the government 
allows organizations to use the license as the basis for future research into cannabinoid-
related drugs. The patent does not prove that marijuana has a medical purpose for its 
stated use, it provides a base for future research that prove this claim (Wallace 2016; U.S. 
6,630,507: 2003).  
This highlights the current paradox: marijuana should be legalized, at least 
exclusively for research, but the DEA & FDA are not yet convinced that it is safe and 
effective to warrant its legalization. Because there has been a ban for so long, the 
research that would legitimize it does not exist, so its prohibition remains. In early 2016, 
the DEA denied marijuana a rescheduling (again). But it did announce that it would 
increase access to the plant for research purposes. Prior to that announcement, it was only 
available through the University of Mississippi. I believe that the U.S. is slowly moving 




market a viable cannabinoid alternative. If this happens (as an economist, I can’t say 
much on the scientific possibility, only the economic consequences), Big Pharma will 
have an alternative for those who wish to try medical marijuana but do not want to leave 
the ethical drug market. Further, these products will be able to compete with international 
products like GW’s Sativex and Epidiolex. And yes, cannabinoids would (assumingly) 
provide a safer substitute to opioids. The prescription cannabinoid would allow drug 
companies to keep the market segmented domestically. The protections on drug 
companies until these products are launched segments the market internationally—all 
while maintaining customer loyalty. 
Drug companies are simply not yet prepared with a competitive, safe, and 
effective cannabinoid product. More importantly, the industry is lobbying against 
marijuana’s legalization to protect the ‘investment’ that they have made on opioids. It is 
no secret that these drugs have created multi-billion dollar profits for Big Pharma; they 
see cannabis as a real threat to those profits. It may be that Big Pharma, right now, is only 
willing to commit their time, efforts, and investments to one set of products. Would they 
prefer to sell opioids, a cash cow; or cannabinoids, a question mark? Legalizing 
marijuana right now actually provides a disincentive to make new opioids since it 
increases competition and reduces profits. I tacitly argue, however, that increasing the 
availability to opioids acts as an incentive to promote innovation and even improve Big 
Pharma’s public image. By developing these products, they position themselves ready to 





However, I think there is a limit to Big Pharma’s intentions. The research on 
marijuana has not yet caught up to what drug companies want to do with the product. 
They have not yet developed a ‘blockbuster’ product. For example, they have not yet 
created a cannabinoid that is at least as effective as opioids in treating chronic pain. As 
Big Pharma lobbies against marijuana’s legalization, under the DEA’s guidance to ease 
access to the plant, they could presumably—and this is just speculation—simultaneously 
do R&D to create a viable cannabinoid. Marijuana would not become fully legalized until 
drug companies are able to successfully launch a product that can compete internationally 
with GW. So in relation to international market segments, the cannabinoid market is an 
infant industry in need of protection from international competition. I do not think that 
they will lobby against marijuana forever. There is definitely a profit incentive in 
capitalizing in opioids and cannabinoids. 
Foundational Studies 
We have seen it is not very likely that the FDA would approve phytocannabinoids 
(cannabis au naturale) as a prescription drug. There is no legal precedent—much less any 
economic incentive—for a company to earn a patent on a specific strain of cannabis. 
Nonetheless, while discussing this, Grinspoon (2001) makes an important observation:  
[w]ith the present prohibition in place, the economic viability of pharmaceutical-
industry-generated cannabinoid products and the motivation to develop them will 
be directly proportional to the vigor with which the marijuana prohibition is 
enforced…[M]ost patients who find cannabis useful medicinally choose illegal 
marijuana over prescription dronabinol (Marinol) for reasons of efficacy and cost. 
One has to ask whether there is any level of enforcement which would compel 
enough compliance to embolden drug companies to commit the many millions of 





He suggests that there will be two separate market developments when 
mentioning the (illegal) cannabis market and the prescription drug market. This is similar 
to my realization shown in Figure 1. He, too, questions whether this separation will be 
conducive to pushing drug makers into producing marijuana-based drugs if consumers 
would strictly prefer the cannabis plant. He mentions elsewhere that while the latter is 
usually more efficacious, there are times when it is not desirable and a synthetic drug is 
not only more effective, but the circumstances demand it, for example if a patient is 
unconscious and s/he requires an intravenous administration (381). This could suggest 
that drug makers may find that selling drugs to hospitals may be especially profitable, or 
that a prescription should take a form that allows for a rapid onset of the drug’s effects, 
like an injection or oral spray. 
Drug companies probably will not steal market share from the cannabis market; 
those who prefer cannabis are antagonistic towards drug companies. Drug companies 
sees a much larger revenue potential in marketing towards those who do not or cannot 
smoke: the elderly, those who oppose marijuana, the employed, and ultimately, those 
who would only purchase it if paid for by their health insurer. Drug companies will not 
operate their own dispensaries selling retail cannabis because that is not their area of 
comparative advantage (although it would be advantageous for them to set up marijuana 
testing labs and sell equipment). “It is doubtful that pharmaceutical companies would 
seem interested in developing cannabinoid products if they have to compete with natural 




capital and meet quality control standards on a scale that surpasses small-time 
dispensaries. 
Schneider (2014) picks up where Grinspoon leaves: Schneider discusses the 
corporatization of marijuana and the anticipated (positive) effects on states’ tax revenues. 
Will ‘big pot’ outpace dispensaries with larger grow operations? He refers to the 
emergence of these so-called “pot capitalists.” Schneider posits that in a legal marijuana 
market, the cash crop will be distributed, sold, taxed, regulated, and controlled much like 
alcohol or tobacco is today. “A profit-focused operation run according to the Big 
Marijuana ethos may only be interested in meeting its quarterly sales projections,” rather 
than focusing on the health needs of the patient (15). Marijuana is likely to become 
commercialized and mass-produced at the expense of cheaper, more inferior quality pot 
that does not prioritize the needs of the patient. These businesses, Schneider says, could 
outpace dispensaries that grow high-quality plants that cater to patients. He believes that 
once marijuana is legal federally, it will be sold only in convenient stores, dispensaries, 
or even large box stores much like a Whole Foods or Wal-Mart. He has no intimation that 
Big Pharma would use it to produce a synthetic version to market new drugs.  
We continue to see that quality seems to be most important determinant in 
product choice. Further, in order to appeal to consumers in the botanic cannabis market, 
preferences for natural remedies—or a disutility that results from generating revenue for 
Big Pharma—may dictate that they will not purchase a cannabinoid, regardless of its 
price. When a cannabinoid becomes marketable, patients in the ethical drug market 




prescriptions for years; in a sense, they are beholden to that market. Patients consuming 
cannabis are loyal to their product as well, as are supplement users. Drug companies’ 
marketing strategy is to target their current customer base, and advertise the higher-grade 
cannabis alternative as more appealing than supplements or phytocannabinoids. This will 
help establish brand loyalty in future patients. 
 Royne et al (2014) find that consumers in each market generally tend to be 
strongly biased towards either ethical drugs or supplements. More importantly, they 
discuss how this applies to each patient’s attitudes toward health awareness:  
Given the differences between the product categories, it can be argued that 
consumers mindfully and proactively research and adopt supplement products 
with the intent of preventing a disease or alleviating symptoms of a condition. 
Conversely, prescription drugs are prescribed to consumers after a disease or 
condition has been diagnosed by their physician. (Royne et al. 2014: 519). 
 
 This supports our assumption that there might exist two separate markets shown 
in Figure 1, with two distinct types of patients with unique sets of preferences. 
Additionally, consumers’ preferences for supplements is positively associated with 
perceived health benefits, so there is a negative association with perceived risks; 
consumers tend (erroneously) to perceive supplements as having fewer risks than 
prescription drugs (526). Ironically, the majority of consumers of supplements use the 
product to treat a condition, finding it to be cheaper—but not necessarily more 
effective—than traditional medicines. A large portion of consumers of these products is 
uninformed about their actual contents, and is indifferent when told their medical benefits 
are dubious (Starr 2015: 478). Royne et al. (2014) found that consumers tend to discredit 




to be safe. Nevertheless, this claim may be false, the product may contain ingredients not 
listed, or it may contain ones that are pharmaceutical-like (Sax 2015: 377). This creates a 
moral hazard problem. Companies make billions in profit because the ingredients in their 
products (or lack thereof), and the advertising for those, are monitored but not enforced 
(Starr 2015: 480-1). 
In conclusion, if drug companies cannot create loyal customers from the natural 
cannabis market, demand is not likely to shift by much, and prices and revenues would 
not increase much further. Therefore, the firm’s objective is not to earn customers from a 
new market (cannabis), but to steal market share from other competitors within the 
ethical drug market. Cannabinoids may even out-compete opioids; patients will shift 
demand from the latter to the former. While patients are still ingesting cannabis, they are 
doing it while still purchasing products in the ethical drug market; patients hold to 
preferences, increase utility, and Big Parma might retain—maybe even increase—profits.  
The current state of the policy literature focuses on states that have already 
legalized or decriminalized the plant. These papers often review the ‘aftermath’ of 
legalization. These case studies determine how well states are regulating the drug (Hoban 
& Patterson 2016; Washington Institute for Public Policy 2013), and offers evidence for a 
nationwide marijuana initiative. One of the more recent seminal papers is from Professor 
Miron. Miron calculated that a regime that legalizes, controls, and taxes marijuana would 
create $10-$14 billion in tax revenue nationwide: $7.7 billion in cost avoidance from 
drug enforcement efforts, and $2-$6 billion in tax revenues (2010). Others look at the 




Proponents argue from a legal or ethical standpoint (Martin & Rashidian 2014; Room 
2010), or from a public health perspective (Fischer et al. 2015; Barry & Glantz 2016; 
Anderson & Rees 2014). Like Schneider (2014), they correctly identify that marijuana 
will be sold commercially and dispensaries will face increased competition, perhaps even 
from Big Tobacco (Barry et al. 2014). Some authors in the scientific literature recognize 
cannabinoids’ value in treating drug and opioid related addictions (Cheer et al. 2015), but 
have not looked at the market developments in the ethical drug industry. They suggest 
that they hold pharmacoeconomic value, but do not mention that Big Pharma has 



















Chapter III: Cannabinoid Drug Pricing Strategies 
Until now, we have discussed how pharmaceuticals are marketed and sold. There 
is much to be said on the topic, especially with regard to pharmaceutical pricing. The 
pricing for drugs is based in large part on patent pricing and market exclusivity granted 
by the chemical for the new drug. The following literature review allows us to extract 
some key pricing structures of the drug industry that will be helpful in the final analysis. 
Thus, this it serves as the methodology for the thesis. In the course of reviewing the 
pricing strategies that Big Pharma uses, we can make educated predictions about what we 
can expect if a drug company were to research, develop, and market a synthetic 
cannabinoid drug. Pricing strategies are evaluated in the broader, dynamic context of 
innovation and discovery. In this chapter, we will see how marijuana pharmaceuticals 
will be priced relative to competitors—both existing and non-existent (i.e. future products 
that have yet to be made).  
This process depends on patents and market exclusivity, so some of these main 
findings are not so surprising. A company making a unique product targeted at a niche 
market can charge a higher price relative to other competitors, if they exist. As a general 
rule for launch price decisions, we can utilize the following rule: 







where u(q) is the utility of a drug, based on the QALY it delivers, c(l) is the degree of 
competition, based on a firm’s market power (Lerner’s Formula) and l  > 0. Basically, a 
drug’s specialization, relative to the size of its therapeutic market, determines its price. 
Monopolists gain an advantage if they can distance themselves as far apart as possible 
from their competition. This creates ‘submarkets’ in which they exert market power 
(d’Aspermont et al. 1979). As a reminder, we should think of product differentiation in 
the ethical drug market as it relates to the comparability of attributes of various drugs. 
Consumer goods must add value to the customer’s life; they must fill a need. 
Dean (1969) concluded that monopolies that introduce new “pioneering” products have 
two main strategies: skimming and penetration pricing. In the first, the price is set high 
because the new product has no close substitutes in the market. As knowledge of the 
product dissipates among consumers, the price should tend to fall (Bagwell & Riordan 
1991). Over time, the price falls as the firm reaches those with lower reservation prices. 
Competing products may take on some attributes of the original pioneering product.  
In penetration pricing, drug companies will price new drugs higher in order to 
signal that it performs better than any other option currently available on the market. This 
is supported by a ‘latitudinal region of price acceptance’ around reference prices. Patients 
may be willing to pay slightly more for a product if its higher price is within their frame 
of reference, but not exorbitantly above it (Kalyanaram and Little 1994). This ‘reference’ 
price is formed by comparing similar products and their prices. Over time, patients 
become accustomed to paying these slightly higher prices, leading to marginally rising 




improvements over substitutes induces a slightly higher price that patients will pay. In 
penetration pricing, companies may price very low to ‘penetrate’ the market, establish 
reputation for itself and its products, and raise the price over time. This theory of 
qualitative differentiation between products (and its thrust behind innovation) is a solid 
foundation for thinking about modern pricing practices.  
In the present analysis, we will deduce a pricing strategy for new synthetic 
marijuana pharmaceutical drugs. There are three pricing trajectories for products: i) 
prices are set high and fall over time, ii) prices are relatively constant over time, priced at 
the market price of current market options (i.e. reference pricing), or iii) prices are set 
low and rise over time. 
Dean’s discrete high—medium (“parity”)—low scale is helpful, and it can be 
more continuous. I will add two more levels: high—medium-high—parity—medium-
low—low. Since we are not dealing with quantitative data, this scale should help us 
clarify what we mean when a price is high, but not too high, relative its competitor.  
If we uphold the assumption of therapeutic markets, option i) seems the most 
likely. New cannabinoids will have a general application, but they are improvements of 
older drugs. Over time, as drug patents approach their expiration date or other 
competitors are introduced, prices will start to fall to a medium-low or parity reference 
price. The same is true for advertising expenses. Physicians will prescribe drugs to their 
patients across therapeutic lines regardless of the drug’s indication; the drug’s indication 
allows for its patent, not its ability to be prescribed in its intended market. Advertising 




pushed down. Thus, prices will initially be set at a medium-high price, falling to a 
medium-low or parity price. 
In this chapter, I will first describe how the ethical drug market is defined. This 
will help establish the market structure in which Big Pharma operates and tell us how its 
companies conduct themselves as competing monopolists. Using this setup, I then review 
the economic literature regarding pricing strategies as they relate to the ethical drug 
industry. I begin with the general and theoretical evidence, and then move to specifics 
and empirics. Throughout, my conclusions as they relate to marijuana-based cannabinoid 
drugs specifically, are grounded in the literature review. As we will see, most theoretical 
conclusions on Big Pharma pricing structures support empirical ones.  
Structure-Conduct-Performance 
It is widely agreed that drugs are placed into ‘markets’, defined by the therapeutic 
benefits that the product delivers. New drugs are produced, marketed, and patented 
according to the class of diseases that they are intended to treat. This is called the drug’s 















Early studies typically measured a given firm’s market power to answer questions about 
the concentration of firms in these markets (Egan et al. 1982: 30-3). What makes 
delineating these classes difficult is the fact that one firm can produce various drugs in 
various markets and can monopolize on more than one of them. Physicians can—and 
often do—prescribe a drug for ‘off-label’ ailments, meaning there will likely be some 
overlap among therapeutic markets. 
Assuming that patients with a specific illness create a demand for a particular 
drug (class), we can say that their demand for a class of illness also defines the 
therapeutic market. In other words, when a certain population suffers from a disease, 
patients implicitly demand that pharmaceutical companies create a drug to alleviate the 
symptoms of that disease (or cure it entirely). On the supply side, drug makers produce 
drugs to fill this demand. Physicians have the option to prescribe drugs across therapeutic 
markets, regardless of the drug’s final intended use (Tesler et al. 1975: 475). For our 
purposes, this provokes discussions on cross-elasticity of demand and market power, with 
a focus on firms’ pricing behaviors. Finally, it allows us to see the competition that takes 
place within the industry, and its effect on a firm’s pricing decision of a particular drug.  
In the analysis in this chapter, we hold to these therapeutic classes. We will see 
that defining a therapeutic market as narrowly as possible contributes directly to a drug’s 
specialization. This is integral to deciding a drug’s launch price. So we can imagine that 
when drug companies produce new cannabinoid drugs, they will be marketed within the 
boundaries of these therapeutic markets. However, due to cannabis’s applicability in 
treating many symptoms across a range of diseases, we can conclude that in the case of 
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oncologics, drug companies will create a drug that targets cancer generally, as opposed to 
colon cancer specifically. High prices, therefore, are relegated to specialty and orphan 
drugs. These prices (and the markets in which they are found) provide an extreme case. 
Market Structure & Competitive Forces 
Suppose there is an individual drug company. They have researched and 
developed a new drug and are about to bring it to market. Either there are no companies 
in this therapeutic market, or no companies have yet successfully developed and marked 
their product for sale—they are a pure monopolist. The monopolist innovates new 
products (new output) only as competition necessitates it (i.e. as patents expire). After 
earning their patent, they have ‘cornered the market’. They hold the legal right to exclude 
all competitors from producing the same drug, raising the barriers to entry in the market 
enough to exclude other sellers.   
In this initial scenario, there is one customer, one patient, and no insurance 
through which the patient can purchase the drug; all expenses are out-of-pocket. As 
discussed in previous chapters, insurance companies remove (some of) the burden of the 
patient’s willingness to pay. Relationships between insurance companies and drug 
makers take advantage of this reduced priced sensitivity, and can therefore inflate drug 
launch prices. Without them, the monopolist calculates a price according to the methods 
described below. Setting aside insurance plans isolates economic forces that result in 
drug pricing strategies. In fact, Scherer (2004) says, insurance policies make patients’ 
price-demand elasticity less sensitive and enhances the drug makers’ ability to price well 
above production costs (928). 
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Given a novel drug and a pure monopolist position, the monopolist will charge a 
high price for the drug, above normal competitive market conditions, where price would 
otherwise equal the marginal cost. Levy and Rizansky (2014) show that when the 
monopolist drug maker maximizes profit, the optimal price is higher because drug 
companies are making a product that delivers substantial health benefits compared to 
other drugs (2004: 1-5). The monopolist is a single seller in the market, allowing them to 
differentiate prices among different types of customers with varying income levels.  
The monopolist’s problem becomes: 𝑚𝑎𝑥 p,x  𝜋 =  𝑝(𝑥) ∙ 𝑥 –  𝑐(𝑥), where 
marginal revenue 𝑅′(𝑥) equals marginal cost 𝐶′(𝑥). Maximizing 
𝑑π
𝑑𝑥
 and solving for 𝑝, we 
derive Lerner’s Formula for monopoly power: 
𝑝 = ( 
1
1 + 𝜀𝑝𝑥
 ) ∙ 𝐶′(𝑥) 
Immediately we see that when a monopolist equates 𝑅′(𝑥)  to 𝐶′(𝑥), the degree of 
the price markup Lerner’s formula depends crucially on the degree of own-price demand 
(in)elasticity, 𝜀𝑝𝑥 and marginal cost. It is inversely proportional to the degree of price 
markup itself. This implies that for specialty drugs, drugs that have a low demand 
elasticity, -0.1 and -0.21 (Goldman et al 2006), prices are likely to be much higher. 
Monopolists can exert more market power when the patient has a low price demand 
elasticity for drugs that treat a serious disease and are therefore necessary to survival. As 
the saying goes, when it comes to patients’ drug treatments, it’s “your money or your 
life!” The more effective the drug is in treating serious diseases, the higher the QALYs it 
adds to the patient’s life, the lower the price demand elasticity, leading to a higher 
markup price. It is not difficult to see what it implies for marijuana-based synthetic drugs. 
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Cannabinoid drugs that treat more serious diseases will likely have a lower 𝜀𝑝𝑥, so 𝑝 will 
be higher, and vice versa. Studies have measured 𝜀𝑝𝑥 for cannabis, with a range between 
-0.3 and -0.6 (Nichols & Nichols 2013; Pacula & Lundberg 2014). Using this as an 
approximate reference, a low price demand elasticity reveals that even for general use 
cannabinoid drugs, a monopolist drug maker could afford to charge a high markup price. 
How does monopolist theory measure up to the empirical evidence? The 
performance of monopolists in the drug industry was validated in what has become 
known as the Clemens-Cocks Model. Its main findings were that: 
1) A firm in a technological environment can adapt its R&D and manufacturing 
processes to develop and produce products in several areas of drug therapy. This 
context emphasizes that the behavior of these firms is determined by profit-
maximizing decisions that consider several different kinds of drug products. 
 
2) As firms attempt to develop singular new products, they develop, as a by-
product of R&D, products that compete with existing ones. From an empirical 
standpoint this can be expected to result in a substantial amount of entry into drug 
markets, market shares should be affected, and price pressures should be evident. 
 
3) When an individual firm is successful in developing innovative new products 
whose demand curves presumably are favorable relative to costs, resources should 
flow to that firm as the profit incentive dictates. This implies that the firm that is 
relatively more successful in the stochastic process of finding new drugs should 
receive an increased market share and an increased ex post rate of return (Cocks 
1975 in Chien 1979: 43). 
 
Pure monopolists in the ethical drug industry is an oversimplification, but it tell us 
something about how individual companies price their products in the absence of 
substitutes. The Clemens-Cocks model shows us how companies behave in the face of 
monopolistic competition. What it doesn’t tell us is that when other companies make 
similar (“me-too”) drugs, companies can compete while their products are still on-patent 
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(each firm goes through the FDA approval process with a slightly different product). 
Even if drugs are differentiable, monopolists may engage in price competition. 
In this Bertrand-style competition, “competition between the substitute products 
reduces price somewhat below the monopoly price, depending in part on how 
substitutable are the two drugs” (Brendt et al. 2011: 9-12). In the latter scenario, 
individual firms still make rational profit-maximizing decisions, but the presence of other 
monopolists doing the same thing will inevitably lower the launch price. In a variant of 
the Bertrand model, the Edgeworth duopoly model shows that for two or more firms with 
production constraints, the Nash equilibrium may not exist. Competing monopolists’ 
profit-maximizing prices oscillate between a minimum where p = C’(x), and a maximum 
where C’(x) = R’(x)—the two extremes of Lerner’s Formula. As the degree of 
substitution between products decreases, monopolists’ prices become more rigid. 
“Uncorrelated” goods do not price-compete with each other (Edgeworth 1925: 119-21). 
When authors use a Bertrand duopoly to analyze competition, some assume, as in 
the Bertrand and Edgeworth-Bertrand model, that products between firms are perfectly 
substitutable homogenous products. 
But this framework supposes counterfactually (as Scherer points out), that the 
manufacturer is a monopolist. The reality is that nearly all brand name 
prescription drugs compete with a therapeutically equivalent brand name drugs or 
even chemically indistinguishable generic drugs. A more complete examination of 
prescription drug pricing would consider the non-cooperative oligopolistic 
interactions among pharmaceutical manufacturers whose drugs are close 
substitutes. This can be done using a differentiated-products Bertrand oligopoly 
model (Elzinga and Mills 1997: 293-4). 
 
A “differentiated-products Bertrand oligopoly model”, which derives from Edgeworth’s 
“uncorrelated” goods case, is essentially a Hotelling model. In this model, studied more 
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carefully in the next chapter, the more effective monopolies are in differentiating their 
products, the greater the profits that they are able to capture. It essentially relies on a 
company’s ability to advertise its ‘uniqueness’ over its competitors. 
 Firms are able to obtain these profits because rather than cornering the entire 
therapeutic market, they advertise to create brand-loyal patients. “[T]he manufacturer 
can…concentrate on operation as a monopoly firm in the market of loyal consumers” 
(Ismo 2008: 2 citing Frank & Salkever 1992). In this way, firms retain their customers, 
effectually making their demand more inelastic. The result is the market power that, a 
priori, we should expect a monopolist pharmaceutical firm to wield. Assuming patients 
are willing to pay a higher price for a product with fewer side-effects, for example, and 
strongly believe that their product of choice stands alone in this regard, this would also 
explain why prices for brand-name drugs may increase following patent expiration 
(Frank & Salkever 1992 citing Wagner and Duffy 1988; Ramsey 2016). Although an 
insurance company’s payment policies are a contributing factor, companies may simply 
be targeting a higher-income consumer market. 
The price for new drugs must cover the costs of R&D from intense competitive 
pressures by the company to patent a marijuana drug for a certain therapeutic market. The 
fact that the drug contains synthetic cannabinoids will not be proprietary information. 
Drugs like Cesamet, Syndros, and Marinol disclose this information on their packaging, 
and Sativex and Epidiolex openly claim their use of cannabis extracts—not synthetics— 
to attract patients to their product; companies forego the secrecy in ingredients typically 
found in other drugs. This means that companies might lose some of the advantages of 
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persuasive marketing that convince customers that their product is more unique than their 
competitor’s. As a result, there is a degree of substitution (however slight) of cannabinoid 
products across a variety of applications. Companies compete on a price point rather than 
on qualitative differences, as an Edgeworth-Bertrand competition model suggests. 
Cannabinoid prices will be set relative to the (non)cannabinoid product with which it 
competes. Assuming a drug is an improvement over the other, but not so specific as to 
warrant a high price, a cannabinoid will generally be given a medium-high launch price.  
Rather than a company chemically creating a secret new chemical and thus 
claiming intellectual property over it, the use of synthetic cannabis would not be 
proprietary information. Marijuana’s medicinal benefits have been known for centuries. 
Unlike any other drug, whose ‘recipe’ is confidential, cannabis is public knowledge. Any 
drug company could use it. So, the name of a new drug might convey that it contains a 
marijuana analog compound. For example, names like Sativex, Cannador, and Marinol 
are references to Sativa, Cannabis, and “Mari”juana, respectively. Companies would find 
it futile to try to hide this information from the customer.  
The response to this is quite simple. It can be imagined that out the outset of 
marijuana’s legalization (for scientific research purposes), individual drug companies 
begins a ‘race’ to be the first to research and develop a new product, one that improves 
over its predecessors—the ‘recipe’ contained in Marinol and Cesamet—and targets a 
specific indication or therapeutic market. Only those drugs which make it through the 
FDA’s approval process will be granted market approval—the rest will be unsuccessful.  
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This is not a “winner take all” race, but a “first past the post” one: the first 
company to successfully market an improved marijuana pharmaceutical will not reveal 
the new ‘recipe’. The only thing that their competitors will know is that the other has 
made some kind of improvement over the existing cannabinoid recipe, without explicitly 
stating what that improvement is; they will only learn of the new indication. Drug 
companies will patent the synthesis processes of the various compounds, and the new 
compounds themselves. So when a future drug maker develops a cannabinoid drug, it 
will be patented according to its indication and the process used. Generally, the larger the 
number of indications, the lower the market price. Competitive forces, as predicted by the 
Clemens-Cocks model and Bertrand oligopolistic competition, should put pressure on 
cannabinoid drug prices in the marketplace. 
Value- and Performance-Based Pricing Strategies 
The price of a new drug depends on a firm’s success in differentiating it from a 
competing product. With the substitute acting as a ‘reference price’, it determines how 
much a price may deviate from any other possible substitute, with respect to its 
therapeutic benefits. For the patient, the reference price establishes a base line for 
perceived value or the utility of the next best alternative. Drug makers are able to price 
above this if the net benefits of their product is positive—and below if the additional 
perceived value is negative (Gregson et al 2005). Firms remain price makers, but they 
account for improvements over their competitor’s product. For example, prices for 
current cannabinoid market options like Marinol and Cesamet will serve as reference 
prices for new cannabinoid products. To the patient’s knowledge, these are the closest 
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substitutes in the ethical drug market without consuming botanic cannabis. Product 
characteristics can be reflected in fewer side effects, higher potency, longer-lasting 
therapeutic effects, and different modes of administration (e.g. a pill vs. an oral spray). 
This gives them a competitive advantage over possible substitutes. Marinol and Cesamet 
are more potent than cannabis since they offer high THC (psychoactive component) and 
low CBD (physical healing component) content. 
Modern-day drug pricing strategy relies heavily on value-based pricing. In a 
recent study, the authors used trial data, conditional on its expected benefit added to the 
patient, the patient’s willingness to pay (set at some threshold, which is the only 
constraint on the optimal price in each stage of development trials). They assigned value-
based price was zero if the trial result was not statistically significant, and otherwise 
adjusted based on added cost-effectiveness. From there, the authors forecasted profit rates 
using a Bayesian probability analysis and determined a market price (Breeze & Brennan 
2015). A statistically insignificant price is zero for the same reason that a drug company 
will drop a product from the development pipeline if it fails to show effectiveness. As 
trials progress, if the product does not show promising signs, or if it is not a significant 
improvement over the company’s competitors, development will be aborted. A price of 
zero (in this study) translates into a product is not adding value to the customer. This 
approach is a distant relative to the classic study of ‘theory of the firm’. At each stage of 
development, a new product should be priced such that the marginal benefit equals the 
marginal cost of adding the input.  
The most profitable way to attract customers from rivals is not necessarily only to 
lower price; product improvement and innovation will also contribute to 
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profitability, and at the margin, the ratio of the benefit added to profit by lower 
price to the benefit from further innovation should be equated to the ratio of their 
respective marginal costs (Egan et al 1982: 47-8 citing Brozen 1975).  
 
In other words, the input price should equal its marginal benefit to the final product.  
 Breeze and Brennan’s value-based pricing and the classical theory of the firm 
come together to inspire Dimitiri’s (2014) work. Her paper essentially says that in each 
stage of the development period, the market price for the drug will equal the expected 
profits at that stage; as the drug moves closer to marketing, the probability that it will be 
successful increases, as does the market price. Dimitri considers the development in a 
network of research firms. Either a drug company could develop the product itself “in-
house”, or it can buy the rights from another firm. This takes on an important distinction 
if the drug fails in a phase of testing. The company does not drop the product from its 
line, but instead:  
[these price and profit] considerations provide a benchmark for the market price. 
If the selling company cannot afford development up to registration [of the new 
drug] (e.g. it is a small firm), a larger buying firm could exploit its ‘buyer power’ 
by negotiating a lower transaction price (217).  
 
Dimitri concludes with something obvious: the price of the drug equals its expected 
payoff to the firm. Big Pharma will purchase future cannabinoid recipes—failed or not—
from smaller, less capital-intensive drug companies, as the Clemens-Cocks model 
suggests. Larger companies like Merck & Co. will have better probabilities at successful 
development simply due to their larger capacity to conduct R&D successfully. The price 
at which the rights are purchased from small firms, based on their proven effectiveness, 
sets a benchmark for the launch price. The QALYs added to the patient sets a premium 
on this benchmark, an upper limit. 
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The practice of putting a drug into a price range, rather than a unique discrete 
price as in Dimitri, is known as performance-based pricing. When a drug meets certain 
“milestones” or “endpoints” in terms of efficacy (value-based), rather than progressing 
into the next development stage regardless of efficacy (performance-based), a price could 
be negotiated (Dranitsaris et al 2015). The proposed policy in Dranitsaris is based on 
some well-known practices that are widely used in the U.K. Specifically, a drug’s price is 
based on the Quality of Life Adjusted Years (QALY)—the longevity a medical procedure 
can add to a person’s life.  
Evidence shows that drugs that treat acute conditions have a higher price than 
those that treat chronic conditions (Taubman & Mason 1989 in Kolassa 1997: 55-56); 
Brendt et al. (2011) confirm that this is found in the case of specialty drugs: drugs that 
treat a very specific—maybe even rare—condition. For this class of drugs there are often 
no close substitutes, so both buyers and sellers know the high price is justified. This is 
emphasized as a point of exaggeration: this is not the case for cannabinoids. Rather, this 
contrast helps us understand how new cannabinoid products that treat a broad range of 
symptoms will opt for a lower price than a drug that treats a specific illness like a specific 
type of cancer, Multiple Sclerosis, or seizures. It is unlikely that cannabinoids will be 
specialty, orphan drugs (Epidiolex is the exception, since it is the first of its kind on the 
market). A drug that treats general symptoms instead of a specific disease has many more 
competitors. The more intense the competition, the lower the price. 
Zaric (2008) formally modeled this. He uses a Markov probability distribution of 
a disease progression, in which death is the final stage. This distribution models how a 
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manufacturer will set its drug price based on: a patient’s willingness-to-pay, cost 
effectiveness of the drug, and the aggressiveness of the disease’s progression.  
There is a relationship between population heterogeneity and the optimal 
proportion of the population that is targeted. For a relatively homogenous 
population (not much variation in [the progression of the disease between patients 
in the population]) it is optimal to set a high price and target a relatively 
restrictive subset of the population, whereas for a relatively heterogeneous 
population it is optimal to set a lower price and get a greater proportion of the 
population. Thus, it is important for manufacturers to understand the entire 
distribution…when setting prices… (1287).  
 
(It should be noted that in Zaric’s study that cost effectiveness has a greater influence on 
insurer’s reimbursement decision of a patient’s drug.) When the drug is a one-of-a-kind, 
and the disease is equally as threatening, the drug company is able to exert a significant 
amount of market power to get the patient to pay the asking price.  
A higher cross-price elasticity of demand will naturally lend itself to lower drug 
prices. Chen and Rizzo (2010) develop a conceptual framework to find that in the market 
for antidepressant drugs, which, they say, is known to be a market with many close 
substitutes. “[I]n markets where products are relatively well-differentiated, higher quality 
entrants will tend to adopt a market skimming pricing strategy. In more homogenous 
markets, we expect…a market penetration pricing strategy” (297). This may also occur if 
consumers are uncertain of the new drug. Companies may trade short-term profit losses 
“to familiarize consumers with the product, reaping the benefits of higher market shares 
and prices over time” (Chen 2008: 9-10; Schmalensee 1982). In rare cases, companies 
will maintain a low price to deter other companies from competing. Once they’ve 
cornered the market, they will raise it (Chien 1979: 85).  
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As the market for which a given cannabinoid drug can be prescribed is enlarged, a 
skimming pricing strategy becomes more likely. Essentially, U.S. drug makers will 
launch the drug at a medium-high price to compete for market share sought after by 
outside drug companies like GW Pharmaceutical’s Sativex or Epidiolex. Eventually, these 
prices will fall to parity with close (non)cannabinoid substitute drugs with similar 
treatments and side effects. Even though enlarging the market should reduce prices, drug 
companies will be able to offer a higher price. Cannabinoids will deliver, assumingly, a 
better quality of life compared to the product with which it is competing. If this were not 
the case, they would be offered one ‘level’ below at a parity reference price. Also recall 
from Chapter II that the quality, accessibility, and convenience of this product affords it 
an additional premium above the reference price. 
Given the availability to information about synthetic cannabinoids and their 
utility, companies will not likely try to persuade customers in their advertising that one 
drug treats only one condition. Sativex and Epidiolex are formally indicated to treat 
Multiple Sclerosis and epilepsy, respectively, but their oral spray delivery method makes 
it quite likely that patients will soon have it prescribed to them for a whole range of 
therapeutic reasons. Sativex and Epidiolex will likely be prescribed across therapeutic 
markets, increasing the cross-price elasticity of demand. The same may be true of to-be 
other synthetic cannabinoid drugs.  
Regarding general use drugs, how will companies price their rebranded products 
that are now off-patent and competing with cheaper generics? Consider, for example, 
OxyContin (oxycodone HCL). An improved version would be OxyContin + CBD. This 
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would be repackaged and sold as an ‘improved’ brand-name OxyContin. It would be 
priced higher than traditional OxyContin and other competitors like Vicodin 
(hydrocodone and acetaminophen). When synthetic cannabinoid products are rebranded, 
we should expect that their prices will start a medium-high after rebranding. They will 
follow a similar trajectory as described above.  
In any case, the decline in prices will be the result of a couple things. First, since 
cannabinoid drugs can be prescribed across therapeutic markets, there is more room for 
competition. Competition will necessitate more intense advertising—promotional costs 
which will keep prices pegged to drug prices. According to Chen & Rizzo’s (2010) 
conclusions, it is likely that prices will remain low. Both the increase in advertising and 
the increase in value added to the patient’s life will offset any pressures on prices. In the 
special case where a synthetic marijuana drug treats a specialty market or serious disease 
where all other products have failed, the drug could actually warrant a further increase in 
price. This should be considered the exception, though, not the rule.  
Pricing in Practice: Empirical Work 
Most of the conclusions about how the industry prices its products were found in 
the early years of the pharmacoeconomic discipline. The most relevant papers often cited 
from the literature are between the 1960s and 1980s. Reekie (1978) was the first to 
examine price trends for new drugs, extending Dean’s concepts of skimming and 
penetration pricing to pharmaceuticals. He found that new pharmaceutical drugs that 
present pioneering advancements are priced higher than any close substitutes on the 
market, while imitators are priced much lower.  
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Like Dean, (1969), most authors in the literature use ordinal terms to describe 
pricing and profits. “High” and “low” have no apparent numeric value. Reekie (1978) 
addressed this by referring to prices on a discrete range of low-medium-high price by 
calculating ratios of the average price of the new product relative to the weighted average 
price of leading competitive drugs. “Low” prices had a ratio of less than 1.0, “medium” 
prices, 1.0-1.5, “high” prices, above 1.5.  
As patents approach expiration, companies begin to lower prices to anticipate the 
entry of generic drugs. “While monopoly positions are conferred, patent protection does 
not normally confer the power to monopolize any of the therapeutic markets. This is 
borne out by the high turnover among leading firms and the vigorous product competition 
within these markets” (Comanor in Chien 1979: 39). In a follow-up study to the 
Clemens-Cocks theoretical model, high market concentration ratios were found alongside 
high market entry rates: “Successful new drugs appear and seize a commanding position 
only to falter after five or more years and are replaced by, presumably, better rivals” 
(Tesler et al. 1975: 460). This model predicts that drug companies making synthetic 
cannabinoids will monopolize in multiple therapeutic markets, these drugs will compete 
with existing options, and that firms will be profitable. 
The oft-cited Lu & Comanor (1998) study supported Reekie’s findings. They 
found that pioneering products were priced about 3.2 times any close substitute; new 
drugs offering smaller, modest gains were introduced with prices 2.17 times substitutes, 
and those offering little-to-no gain were priced relatively equivalent to substitutes. 
Although this study is relatively newer, it analyzed new drugs developed between 1978 
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and 1987. They also looked at these drugs’ prices over time, at 4, 6, and 8 year intervals. 
All prices, essentially, are set based on a qualitative (“therapeutic”) improvement over 
competitors. Thus, at each stage of pre-market and pre-clinical trials, drug companies are 
reviewing the launch price based on the product’s marginal benefit. As monopolists, drug 
companies are at liberty to set any price for their products, insofar as it reflects a (lack of) 
similarity in available substitutes and an increase medicinal value.  
The dynamic among competing, price-making monopolies is unique to the drug 
industry. But it should be noted that this value-based approach only sets an upper limit 
price for a pricing range. This determines what the market will bear. The company’s 
perspective sets a lower limit for a price range, determined by a minimum return on 
investment needed to satisfy shareholders (Gregson et al 2005). The evidence makes it 
apparent that future synthetic marijuana drugs will be priced similarly. Ones that are less 
addictive than opioids or otherwise offer fewer adverse side effects will afford a higher 
price. Cannabinoids that are marginally better than competing products will use those 
products as a reference price. 
The rise in prices is largely dependent on the types of patients the drugs target 
rather than the competition among those drugs which, as we have seen in general use 
drugs, should be pressured downward (if they are new innovations at the time of market 
introduction). Further, since demand price elasticity for these drugs is very inelastic 
(Goldman et al 2006), drug makers with great market power can exploit patient’s need 
for the drug, measured by a higher willingness-to-pay. Drug makers factor this low price 
demand elasticity into their Lerner’s markup price. This shows that the conclusions from 
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theoretical papers support empirical ones. This would also explain why the prices of 
specialty oncology drugs have been rising despite small therapeutic gains in new drugs 
(Howard et al 2015). Manufacturers can still produce drugs that are not associated with 
large QALY gains, yet they may still fetch a much higher prices since they serve a 
specialty market. Even if new drugs are small improvements above others, high drug 
prices are a result of marketing in a therapeutic market where patients have a high 
willingness-to-pay for potentially life-saving treatments. The new advancement in 
technology will provide a push for more efficient drugs. Investors will set a lower limit 
on the price range for cannabinoids. Patients’ willingness-to-pay will set the upper limit. 
Without identifying a clear independent variable, the effect of patent expiry on 
price change is ambiguous: prices (and quantities) can rise or fall for drug prices; there is 
evidence to support both trends. This significant variable, Lakdawalla & Philipson (2012) 
say, is advertising. It is reflective of drug’s launch price and the trajectory that it will 
follow. When there are multiple firms competing for market share and advertising their 
own products to patients (and physicians), it offers better insight to pricing strategies. The 
largest costs tend to be in advertising, which can be as much as twice the expenditures on 
R&D (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008 in O’Connor 2014: 573). Rising drug prices have to 
recoup rising developmental and promotional costs.  
Recall that Lerner’s Formula shows how demand elasticity rises with a restriction 
in quantity. But this inefficiency can be lessened when the elasticity of demand with 
respect to advertising is higher. By contrast, patent expirations may reduce output if 
companies reduce advertising efforts by enough to offset the impact of price reductions.  
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The estimated demand function implies that in the short run (first 5 months), 
output decreases after patent expiration because the reduction in advertising more 
than offsets the reduction in price…not until several years has elapsed does the 
price effect dominate the reduction in advertising (2012: 153-5, 158).  
 
What that means empirically, Lakdwalla & Philipson find, is that when drug patents 
expire, ones that remain fully advertised see a price increase and quantity decrease. 
Likewise, for drugs with little-to-no advertising, prices behave as we would expect 
according to the standard monopoly theory: prices decrease and quantities increase (168). 
Given the influx of a variety of cannabinoid products, the direct-to-consumer advertising 
for these drugs will largely increase in the patent’s earlier years. Generally, prices will be 
set at a relatively high price before falling after patents expire and generics become 
available. If the product has a more narrow specialization, some companies may increase 
prices to capitalize on patients’ brand loyalty. 
At this point, we can see how firms’ pricing strategies, when tied to advertising, 
can explain the problem of rising drug prices across the industry. Though a pressing 
issue, rising price trends is not the focus here. Our investigation of individual firm’s 
pricing strategies is complete. A drug’s launch price is a function of: patients’ 
willingness-to-pay as income dictates, advertising and promotional costs, patient’s cross-
price demand elasticities for substitutes, and value-based competition among competitors. 
We have also not considered generic entry into the market. Suffice to say, generic 
cannabinoid medicines will contribute to falling cannabinoid prices.  
Throughout this literature, we have arrived at some important conclusions: 
1. Specialization vs. General Use: New drugs are priced relative to 
competitors. New drugs offering significant benefits over competitors 
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will be priced higher, but this price is likely to decline over time. The 
opposite is true of a drug offers marginal or no benefits over other market 
options. A drug with a very specific indication is priced much higher than 
a drug that can be prescribed across a range of therapeutic markets. 
2. Skimming vs. Penetration Pricing: If the patient is uncertain of the drug’s 
effects, drug makers will ‘penetrate’ the market with an initial low price 
offering. If the drug is widely anticipated, the opposite is true, and drug 
makers will ‘skim’ patients with higher levels of willingness-to-pay for 
better health, lowering the price over time. 
3. High Market Concentration Ratios: This leads us to believe that products 
are priced according to traditional monopolist theory, where marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue, and the resulting mark-up over marginal cost 
depends on the elasticity of demand (Lerner’s Formula). Firms may also 
price discriminate among patients’ levels of willingness-to-pay. 
4. Promotional Costs: Price is not the only consideration for a patient’s 
decision to try a new drug. Drug makers gain monopoly and pricing power 
by creating brand-loyal patients. After patent expiration on name-brands, 
generics enter the market. Drug makers raise their prices and some 
patients will continue to purchase the former because of higher income 
levels or marketers persuade patients that name-brand drugs are of 
superior quality. In this way, the market is segmented through intense 
advertising and promotion. Therefore, we should expect some competition 
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in the drug market to result in a Bertrand-style non-price competition. A 
large contributing factor to price trends includes promotional intensity. 
The output decision in a cannabinoid’s pricing requires many inputs, including: 
 Cross-market & off-label prescriptions 
 Introduction of generic cannabinoid products & international competition 
 Improved quality, access, and convenience of cannabinoids over cannabis 
 Expected profits determined by the price at which large drug companies 
purchase intellectual property rights to develop their failed products 
 Improved quality of cannabinoids over opioids and other ethical drugs 
usually associated with addiction and negative side effects 
 Drug companies’ (in)ability to drive brand loyalty 
Many other factors are lost in this discussion. We have not considered: regional 
price differences, income between patients affecting rebates, reimbursements, and 
discounts; and we have neglected insurance companies and reference prices as they relate 
to rate setting. This discussion also neglects direct wholesale prices and other measures of 
pharmaceutical pricing. Perhaps a future quantitative study could measure the effect of 
these variables on price. Nevertheless, this study serves as a base model for synthetic 
marijuana pricing strategies. The literature suggests that these prices will be somewhat 
high but fall over time. Nothing below a reference price would justify the time, costs, and 
effort required to bring a new drug to market. If a cannabinoid price were below parity, a 





Chapter IV: Marketing & Pricing for Cannabis Supplements 
As drug companies deepen their knowledge about cannabinoids and marijuana in 
general, researchers may uncover new compounds. Unlike single molecule compounds in 
drugs, these herbal supplements would contain a profile of synthetic THC, CBD, and 
minor compounds that more closely resemble the cannabis plant.  
It is postulated that the beneficial therapeutic effects of cannabis result from the 
interaction of different cannabinoids and other compounds present in Cannabis 
sativa L. This may explain why cannabis-based medicines made from whole plant 
extracts may be more effective than single cannabinoid products [like Marinol or 
Syndros] (Stott 2004: 85).  
 
In this chapter, we review the other half of the market, OTC herbal supplements 
sold in retail stores vs. cannabis sold in marijuana dispensaries, shown in Figure 1. We 
explore the marketing options for each, with special attention given to herbal 
supplements. We then apply these conclusions to rationalize pricing decisions. 
These product prices are based on the production costs it takes to bring them to 
market. Contrast this with pharmaceuticals, whose prices are largely based on market 
exclusivity. Pricing of herbal supplements depends on consumer demand and a traditional 
cost-plus pricing method: they are priced at marginal cost plus a rate of profit premium, 
derived from rents on advertising and some degree of substitution (which would be zero 
if the goods were perceived as homogenous). Prices will probably be lower for 
supplements than cannabis, and even lower than pharmaceuticals to reflect a lower grade 
of quality. Herbal supplements will adopt a medium-low to low price skimming strategy. 
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As we will see, a lack of quality control and patent pricing, targeting lower-income 
consumers, increased advertising, and a broader range of therapeutic applications are all 
factors that will determine this outcome. Note that supplements do not add value to the 
launch price in the same way that a prescription drug does. This applies to non-price 
competing products. In the marijuana market, presumably the price competition 
determines the final price. In other words, since price is indicative of product quality, 
product differentiation with respect to quality is the lens through which we examine 
consumers’ product choices. 
Cannabis as an Herbal Supplement 
The interaction between dispensaries and nutrition stores provides a unique 
opportunity to use Hotelling’s linear model. It provides rich insight into marketing and 
pricing structures. Companies compete for customers within their own strata, whether it 
be physical distance, product quality, or customers’ income levels (de Frutos et al. 2013).  
Regarding the latter, companies typically market OTC supplements to those with 
a lower level of willingness-to-pay for health (McCann in Sax 2015: 378). In support of 
this, evidence shows that the demand for supplements increased during the Great 
Recession (Gross 2009), when income levels were greatly reduced. Any potential 
customer using cheaper herbal supplements will be a price-sensitive, moderate-to-light 
user who does not feel a sense of loyalty to purchase from dispensaries. These customers 
may find that OTC herbal supplements are more cost-effective for them; they value 
marijuana’s benefits but cannot afford botanic cannabis. Supplements therefore capitalize 
on a consumer segment with a lower willingness-to-pay and consequently has limited 
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access to health information on these products. This neatly summarizes monopolists’ 
ability to discriminate prices among consumer markets. 
Market Structure & Competitive Forces  
Let us first review the basic Hotelling model depicted below in Figure 2. Suppose 
that there are two stores selling the same good. Consumers are equally spaced between 
two companies, and the midway point is exactly halfway between both stores. Customers 
seek to maximize their utility, and minimize transportation costs of travelling to the store. 
It stands to reason that customers will patron the store nearest to them. If either store 
decides to relocate closer to the midway point, they will be closer to a greater number of 
customers and thus gain a larger market share. Each store have an incentive to do this, so 
in this game’s Nash equilibrium, both stores settle at the midway point; each store earns 
50% of the market share (Hotelling 1929; Roy 2000). In the Edgeworth-Bertrand version 
of the Hotelling model, the firm that lowers its price will capture a greater market share, 
but prices will oscillate between a monopolist’s price p, determined by Lerner’s Formula, 
and p’ (Edgeworth 1925: 119-21) as in the competitive case where p = marginal cost. 
  
 
We can readily apply this to the marijuana market. Consider two stores: a 
marijuana dispensary selling cannabis, and a retail shop selling dietary and herbal 
supplements. On the west side of town, the dispensary serves the cannabis-preferring 
clientele. On the east side of town, the nutrition store caters to those who prefer health 




They enjoy a positive level of utility from the health supplements purchased on the other 
side of town—despite the transportation cost that it imposes. In other words, it is still 
worthwhile to buy the good since the benefit outweighs its cost. The same is true for the 
cannabis-preferring clientele on the east side of town. In a one time period model, it is 
assumed that each company has not yet built a new store on the opposite side of town. If 
they did, Hotelling’s Law tells us that they will be in close proximity to each other. 
Realistically, if the two stores relocated closer to each other, each would earn a greater 
market share, but sell their products at lower prices. 
Think of the ‘distance’ between stores as a metaphor for product choice within a 
product space. Customers choose the product that most closely fits their exogenously 
given preferences. In the market explored in this chapter, there are customers who prefer 
supplements and those who prefer botanic cannabis. Both products advertise similar 
therapeutic benefits; however, loyal cannabis customers may find that herbal supplements 
are therapeutically inferior. Likewise, herbal supplement users may find that cannabis is 
therapeutically superior, but nonetheless unaffordable. Heavy cannabis smokers are likely 
to remain loyal to their local dispensary. If they need oils or supplements, they obtain 
them at the dispensary or at home—not the nutrition store. These users prefer the 
experience, culture, and effectiveness of smoked cannabis and are willing to pay more for 
it. They will not get the same utility from simply ingesting a pill! Cannabis supplements 
therefore serve as a lower-grade option for customers with reduced income levels. In the 
general sense, these products are not acquired tastes; ‘learning’ an appreciation for the 
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other product creates a ‘transportation cost’ of moving toward that good within the 
product space.  
Hotelling’s Law tells us that firms who can ‘move towards each other’ in terms of 
product differentiation, will do so. Firms who cannot differentiate themselves will see a 
loss in market share to their competitor. Given some degree of cross-price demand 
elasticity, cannabis and herbal supplement users are likely to see the quality between the 
two with some degree of substitution. (At this point, this degree is indeterminate, but it 
may be small and positive).  
Supplement makers must effectively advertise to cannabis users in order to 
increase this degree of substitution, though it seems unlikely that they will be successful. 
We may conclude that supplements will diverge from cannabis in the product space in 
terms of quality. It does this by advertising that supplements have all the same 
characteristics of cannabis, but at a cheaper price. This way, they make supplements out 
to be as similar to botanic cannabis as possible. However, there is actually large 
difference in quality: supplements are less effective, have lower standards of quality 
control, and are less potent. Strangely, the two products will diverge in terms of quality, 
but slightly converge in terms of product differentiation. Since the former effect largely 
overpowers the latter, cannabis will face less competition from supplements—but this 
will probably be counteracted by the increase in competition against other dispensaries; it 
will continue to cater to heavy smokers who are loyal to the cannabis submarket.  
This kind of product competition results from market structures for dietary 
supplements that are far less regulated than that of pharmaceuticals. It would be no 
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different than comparing competing food products—because supplements are considered 
foods. There is less rigor in terms of development, regulation, and marketing. In fact, the 
claims made on the bottles are often not scientifically proven, and the FDA does not 
strictly regulate them. Unlike pharmaceuticals, dietary supplements are not required to 
prove that they are safe and effective for human consumption before they are sold. Only 
when a supplement claims to treat, diagnose, or cure a disease does the FDA require that 
a supplement be approved as a drug. This laissez-faire policy on supplements is a 
construct of the current legislation, the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act 
(DSHEA) of 1994. “The regulation created an incentive for marketers to make relatively 
nonspecific structure-function claims rather than more explicit health claims because 
structure-function claims did not require documentation of safety or proof of efficacy” 
(Mason & Scammon 2011: 202).  
As noted earlier, a large portion of consumers of these products is uninformed 
about their actual contents, and is indifferent when told their medical benefits are dubious 
(Starr 2015: 478). Royne et al. (2014) found that consumers tend to discredit these claims 
altogether. Consumers may see a product advertised as ‘natural’, believing it to be safe. 
Nevertheless, this claim may be false, the product may contain ingredients not listed, or it 
may contain ones that are pharmaceutical-like (Sax 2015: 377). This creates a moral 
hazard problem. Companies make billions in profit because the ingredients in their 
products (or lack thereof), and the advertising for those products, are monitored (by the 
FCC, not the FDA) but not enforced (Starr 2015: 480-1). Moreover, they will come in 
different strengths to mimic the effects of different cannabis strains. 
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Marijuana Supplement Marketing 
What does all of this imply for marketing cannabis oil supplements? Foremost, 
the makers of these products would not need to show that they are safe and effective. 
Even though the information on the medical benefits of marijuana are vast and easily 
accessible, consumers may be disinclined to research them. If they are likely to buy these 
products en masse, producers need not invest the multi-millions of dollars required of the 
drug industry to prove product safety. Sans patent pricing, this allows supplement makers 
to price much lower than pharmaceuticals. Implicitly, consumers could use supplements 
for ‘off-label’ health problems. Supplement makers could advertise this superficial low-
cost treatment option for wide-ranging ailments.  
There is no assurance that one brand’s version of cannabis oil will be comparable 
to the next. Different brands could claim that their product comes from a unique strain of 
cannabis known to treat a certain ailment, but there may not be an accurate listing of 
ingredients or dosage amounts. This results in products that may have dubious and 
biological effects in treating a specific condition—and supplement makers need not 
advertise otherwise. In fact, the risk falls on the consumer for using the product, who is 
generally uninformed on the ingredients in supplements or erroneously believes that the 
FDA regulates them. Producers will likely use pharmaceutical-like cannabinoid analogs. 
The description on the bottle will describe how their product can help alleviate certain 
conditions, but they will not claim that it can treat, diagnose, or cure them.  
Again, since price is indicative of quality, and quality is sub-par, prices for 
generic herbal supplements could be below parity with cannabis, slightly inflated by 
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advertising costs. Customers who want a higher quality product must be willing to pay 
the higher price. This medium-low price falls over time as advertising costs decrease; 
recall that Lakdawalla & Pilipson (2012) found that declining market prices are pegged to 
advertising costs. Prices decline as the originality of the product dissipates, and patients 
‘learn’ that its quality is inferior to botanic cannabis. It is not likely that prices for 
cannabis will increase much further. If marijuana were legalized and more 


















Chapter V: Are Cannabinoids the New Opioids? 
In the late 20th century, the introduction of birth control caused a great shift in the 
drug industry. In the early 21st century, it was opioids. Cannabinoids could prove to be 
the third great shift. Eventually, marijuana will be federally legalized, taxed, and 
regulated. Drug companies will have full access to the plant to develop products that will 
replicate its effects. Although its stigma continues for many who still use marijuana, it is 
slowly fading; marijuana will emerge into the state-of-the-art medical practice. With the 
expansion of a revolutionary new class of drugs, could their novelty—and substitution 
effect on other drugs—reduce prices and demand for competing pharmaceuticals, 
including opioids? This is an intriguing speculation worthy of further research.  
This paper has been a useful exposé of the core of the drug industry’s pricing 
strategies. It helps us understand the strategic process that goes into determining a drug’s 
price, which many deem as overtly exploitative. Most drugs rely heavily on a price that 
correlates to the advances in medical treatment it has begotten. Often times, the increase 
in price justifies cost savings elsewhere in the health system, e.g. hospital visits. Our 
results tell us nothing new in terms of how the pricing strategies will change after 
cannabis’s legalization.  
Summary of Findings 
This work has been an attempt to bridge the gap in the literatures between the 
pharmacoeconomic field and the mainstreaming of marijuana. There is evidence that 
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companies are currently creating these drugs, yet their economic effects in the drug 
industry, especially cannabinoids’ pricing and marketing strategies, has been largely 
unaddressed. Overall, I concluded that if new cannabinoid drugs are brought to market, 
prices would be somewhat high. Some drugs will offer a great contribution to the medical 
practice. If successful, they could treat conditions associated with: cancer, Multiple 
Sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic depression, heart disease, seizures, and more. It is 
likely, however, that cannabinoids would have a more general application. They would 
be new and improved rebrands of older drugs, treating less serious conditions like minor 
headaches. The cannabinoid agent would likely allow these drugs to be used across a 
range of therapeutic markets because they are designed to treat symptoms of an illness, 
rather than a specific disease itself. Therefore, “high” priced drugs would be specialty 
drugs, so cannabinoids should be at least one tier below. The lag time between a drug’s 
launch into a therapeutic market and patients ‘learning’ of its off-label applications would 
correlate with greater competition and a decline in price. 
Similarly, the introduction of generic health supplements could be added to diet 
and exercise regimens, pre-natal care, and more. However, I concluded that cannabis 
health supplements would likely be made cheaply, advertised effectively (albeit still 
dubiously), and may actually compete prices down in the botanic cannabis submarket. 
This result is a function of a Hotelling product space model. Although cannabis and 
supplements are not perfect substitutes, the (assumingly small and positive) degree of 
substitutability provides price competition nonetheless.  
 
63 
A New Way Forward 
This work began with a hypothetical: what would happen if marijuana were 
legalized? It also began with a series of assumptions, most of which are realistic. Of these 
assumptions, we assumed that the ethical drug markets and the marijuana markets were 
separate, that there was very little product competition between these markets’ respective 
products. Admittedly, this assumption may not be sustainable. However, in this work it 
allowed us to analyze the pricing decisions of each product individually. For example, we 
can look at the pricing decisions in a segmented market for prescription drugs without the 
influence of competing products like supplements or naturopathic medicine. 
Although removing this assumption will very likely change our results, I would 
like to reiterate that this work provides a foundation for future studies. Moving forward, 
future research should examine how these products interact and perhaps complement 
each other. What could be the resulting price in that case? This would increase 
competition, more importantly, what marketing strategies might firms devise to reduce 
any arbitrage?  
Furthermore, we also assumed that the market price ‘signals’ to the customer the 
quality of the marijuana product that they are buying. This might be a reasonable 
assumption, but it ignores the fact that prescription drugs (and health care in general) is 
an experience good. The patient cannot ascertain the quality of care they are about to 
receive until they have already consumed the product. Patients may self-select themselves 
into a market, but may not ‘get it right’ the first time. They might experiment with 
various cannabinoid products before settling on the most effective one for their needs. 
 
64 
The reality is that patients are increasingly disillusioned with the drug industry. 
They are substituting pharmaceuticals with marijuana, and drug companies cannot 
continue to resist legalization, or they will continue to leak profits. Further, opiates are 
coming under more intense scrutiny. They have proven to be highly addictive, and are a 
leading cause of accidental deaths across the country. As the epidemic grows more dire, 
drug companies have an incentive to look into developing cannabinoids. By doing so, 
they should take on more corporate social responsibility—lest they come under more 
scrutiny for not taking action, despite being well positioned to do so. Over time, 
increased sales from cannabinoids may even replace opioids. If marijuana were legalized 
before drug companies have a viable product, they could lose domestic and international 
sales. This scenario becomes increasingly probable when considering that nearly 30 states 
have some form of a medical marijuana program. A shifting power balance to state 
legalization could act as a catalyst for Big Pharma’s increased cannabis research efforts. 
Drug companies lobby heavily against marijuana legalization despite definite economic 
benefits in their favor. Once the prohibition is removed and patients can self-select 
themselves either into the cannabis market or the insurer-approved ethical drug market, 
drug companies do not need to worry about losing additional revenue. Therefore, this 
study supports policy efforts to move towards marijuana legalization for scientific 
research and possible prescription drug development. 
If drug companies could successfully market new synthetic cannabinoids, insurers 
may be interested in covering them in future drug plans. Insurance companies have 
significantly more market power to bargain with drug companies. The former can 
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negotiate at which price they will pay for the drug, and this price will likely be lower than 
the initial market launch price determined in this study. The entry of generic 
cannabinoids, especially, will result in much lower cannabinoid drug prices. Cannabis 
must take this route if it is to find its way into the formal health care system. 
It is my hope that this study, in one way or another, has added new knowledge 
and understanding to the conversation on marijuana legalization. Understanding how Big 
Pharma operates, and including drug companies in the anti-prohibition debate, may bring 
a hypothetical legalization to a reality. They are an important stakeholder in the 
conversation so they must be brought to the table. Moreover, I hope that this study is a 


















Anderson, D.; Rees, M. 2014. “The legalization of recreational marijuana: How likely is 
the worst-case scenario?”, Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 33(1): 221-
32. 
 
Ashton, C. H. 1999. “Biomedical benefits of cannabinoids?”, Addiction Biology, 4(2): 
111-26. 
 
d’Aspermont, C.; Gabszewicz, J. J.; and Thisse, J-F. 1979. “On Hotelling’s ‘Stability in 
competition’”, Econometrica, 47(5): 1145-50.  
 
Axelrod, J.; Hampson, A. J.; Grimaldi, M. 2003. U.S. Patent No. 6,630,507. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Barry, R. A. Glantz, S.A. 2016. “A public health framework for legalized retail marijuana 
based on the U.S. experience: Avoiding a new tobacco industry”, PLOSmed, doi: 
10.1371/journal.pmed.1002131. 
 
Barry, R.A.; Hiilamo, H.; Glantz, S.A. 2014. “Waiting for the opportune moment: The 
tobacco industry and marijuana legalization”, The Milbank Quarterly, 92(2): 207-
42. 
 
Bagwell, K.; Riordan, M. H. 1991. “High and declining prices signal product quality”, 
The American Economic Review, 81(1): 224-239. 
 
Berndt, E. R., McGuire, T., & Newhouse, J. P. 2011. “A Primer on the Economics of 
Prescription Pharmaceutical Pricing in Health Insurance Markets”, Forum For 
Health Economics & Policy, 14(2), 1-28. 
 
Breeze, P.; Brennan, A. 2015. “Valuing trial designs from a pharmaceutical perspective 
using value-based pricing”, Health Economics, 24(11): 1476-82. 
 
Campbell, G. 2012. Pot, Inc.: Inside medical marijuana, America’s most outlaw industry. 
Sterling Publishing: New York. 
 
Cheer, J. F.; Covey, D. P.; Wenzel, J. M. 2015. “Cannabinoid modulation of drug reward 




Chen, J. 2008. Three essays on pricing and inequality in pharmaceutical market 
(Doctoral dissertation), ProQuest, 3340091. 
 
Chen, J.; Rizzo, J. A. 2010. “Pricing dynamics and product quality: The case of 
antidepressant drugs”, Empirical Economics, 42(1): 279-300. 
 
Chien, R. I. 1979. Issues in pharmaceutical economics. D.C. Heath and Company: 
Toronto. 
 
Cole, J. 2013. “Guidance regarding marijuana enforcement”, U.S. Department of Justice 
retrieved from: 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf, pp. 1-2 
 
Dean, J. 1969. “Pricing pioneering products”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 17(3): 
165-179. 
 
Department of Justice. 2016. “Applications to become registered under the Controlled 
Substances Act to manufacture marijuana to supply researchers in the United 
States”, Federal Register, 81(156): 53846-48. Retrieved from: 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2016/fr0812_3.pdf.  
 
Di Marzo, V.; de Petrocelli, L. 2006. “Plant, synthetic, and endogenous cannabinoids in 
medicine”, Annual Review of Medicine, 57: 553-574. 
 
Dimitri, N. 2014. “Pricing pharmaceutical compounds under development”, Trends in 
Pharmacological Science, 35(5): 217-8. 
 
Dranitsaris, G.; Dorward, K.; Owens, R. C.; Schipper, H. 2015. “What is a new drug 
worth? An innovative model for performance-based pricing”, European Journal 
of Cancer Care, 24(3): 131-20. 
 




Egan, J. W.; Higinbotham, H. N.; Weston, J. F. 1982. Economics of the pharmaceutical 
industry, Praeger Publishers: New York. 
 
Elzinga, K. G.; Mills, D. E. 1997. “The distribution and pricing of prescription drugs”, 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 4(3): 287-99. 
 
Fischer, B.; Murphy, Y.; Kurdyak, P.; Goldner, E.; Rehn, J. 2015. “Medical marijuana 
programs—Why might they matter for public health and why should we better 




Frank, R. G.; Salkever, D. S. 1992. “Pricing, patent loss and the market for 
pharmaceuticals”, Southern Economic Journal, 59(2): 165-79. 
 
de Frutos, M. A. Ornaghi, C.; Siotis, G. 2013. “Competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry: How do quality differences shape advertising strategies?”, Journal of 
Health Economics, 32(1): 268-285. 
 
Ferner, M. 2015. “Two House bills would end federal prohibition of marijuana.” 




Gladin, C. 2005. Pharmaceutical pricing and research and development investment: A 
secondary analysis that investigates product and patent output (Doctoral 
dissertation), ProQuest Information, 3238563. 
 
Goldman, D. P.; Joyce, G. F.; Lawless, G.; Crown, W. H.; Willey, V. 2006. “Benefit 
design and specialty drug use.” Health Affairs, 25(5): 1319-31. 
 
Gregson, N.; Sparrowhawk, K.; Mauskopf, J.; Paul, J. 2005. “Pricing medicines: Theory 
and practice, challenges and opportunities”, Nature Reviews Drug Discovery,  
doi: 10.1038/nrd1633. 
 
Grinspoon, L. 2001. “On the pharmaceuticalization of marijuana”, The International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 12(5): 377-83. 
 
——. 2010. “Whither medical marijuana”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 
11(2): 75-82. 
 
Gross, D. 2009. “Megavitamins: The vitamin business thrived through the recession. 
Why?” The Slate Group, retrieved from: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2009/10/megavitamins.html. 
 
Hellman, A. D. 1976. Laws against marijuana: The price we pay. University of Illinois 
Press: Chicago. 
 
Hoban, R. T.; Patterson, R. A. 2016. “Sprung from night into the sun: An examination of 
Colorado’s marijuana regulatory framework since legalization”, Kentucky Journal 
of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resource Law, 8(2): 225-301. 
 
Hong, H. S.; Sheperd, M. D.; Scoones, D.; Wan, T. T. H. 2005. “Product-line extensions 




Hotelling, H. 1929. “Stability in competition”, Economic Journal, 39(153): 41-57. 
Howard, D.; Bach, P.; Berndt, E.; Conti, R. 2015. “Pricing in the market for anticancer 
drugs”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(1): 139-162. 
 
Ismo, E. L. 2008. “Advertising, free-riding, and price-difference in the market for 
prescription drugs”, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(2), 
Article 8. 
Lakdawalla, D.; Philipson, T. 2012. “Does intellectual property restrict output? An 
analysis of pharmaceutical markets”, The Journal of Law & Economics, 55(1): 
151-87. 
 
Kalyanaram, G.; Little, J. D. C. 1994. “An empirical analysis of latitude of price 
acceptance in consumer package goods”, The Journal of Consumer Research, 
21(3): 408-418. 
 
Kolassa, E. M. 1997. Elements of pharmaceutical pricing, The Pharmaceutical Products 
Press: Binghamton, NY. 
Levy, M.; Rizansky, A. N. 2014. “The pricing of breakthrough drugs: Theory and policy 
implications”, PlosOne, 9(11), doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0113894. 
 
Lu, J. Z.; Comanor, W. S. 1998. “Strategic pricing of new pharmaceuticals”, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 80(1): 108-118.  
 
Lu, L.; Stein, K.; Shearer, C.; Roome, I.; Lang, H. P. 2013. “Cost effectiveness of Sativex 
for spasticity in Multiple Sclerosis”, Value in Health, 16(3): 1158-1171. 
 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 4751-53. Retrieved from: 
http://legisworks.org/sal/50/stats/STATUTE-50-Pg551a.pdf.  
 
Martin, A.; Rashidian, N. 2014. A new leaf: The end of cannabis prohibition. The New 
Press: New York. 
 
Mason, M. J.; Scammon, D. L. 2011. “Unintended consequences of health supplement 
information regulations: The importance of recognizing consumer motivations”, 
The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 45(2): 201-233. 
 
Mazzucato, M; Parris, S. 105. “High-growth firms in changing competitive 
environments: The US Pharmaceutical industry (1963 to 2002)”, Small Business 
Economics, 44(1), 145-170. 
 
Mazzucato, M; Tancioni, M. 2012. “R&D, patents and stock return volatility”, Journal of 




Mintz, C. S.; Nison, E.; Fabrizio, A. J. 2015. “Cannabis-derived pharmaceuticals”, 
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 21(3): 16-31. 
 
Miraldo, M. 2008. “Reference pricing and firms’ pricing strategies”, Journal of Health 
Economics, 28(1): 176-197. 
 
Miron, J. 2010. “The budgetary implications of marijuana prohibition”, in Earleywine, 
M. (ed) Pot Politics: Marijuana and the costs of prohibition. Oxford University 
Press: 17-39. 
 
Narconon.org. 2017. “History of heroin and opium use and abuse”, retrieved from: 
http://www.narconon.org/drug-information/heroin-timeline.html.  
 
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922, 21 U.S.C.S. § 171. Retrieved from: 
http://legisworks.org/sal/42/stats/STATUTE-42-Pg596.pdf.  
 
Nichols, A. J.; Nichols, M. W. 2013. “The price elasticity of marijuana demand.”  UNR 
Working Paper Series, retrieved from: 
http://www.business.unr.edu/econ/wp/papers/DN1.pdf. 
 
O’Connor, E. 2014. “Emerging promotional and pricing approaches in the US 
pharmaceutical market”, Journal of Product & Brand Management, 23(7): 572-
80. 
 
Opium Prohibition Importation Act of 1924, 21 U.S.C. § 173. Retrieved from: 
http://legisworks.org/sal/43/stats/STATUTE-43-Pg657a.pdf.  
 
Pacula, R. L., & Lundberg, R.. 2014. “Why changes in price matter when thinking about 
marijuana policy: A review of the literature on the elasticity of demand.” Public 
Health Reviews, 35(2): 1-18. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2016. “Support for marijuana legalization continues to rise”, Pew 
Research Center, retrieved from: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/10/12/support-for-marijuana-legalization-continues-to-rise/.  
 
ProCon.org. 2013. “10 pharmaceutical drugs based on Cannabis”, retrieved from: 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000883.  
 
Ramsey, L. 2016. “There’s something odd about the way insulin prices change”, 






Reekie, W. D. 1978. “Price and quality competition in the United States during industry”, 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 26(3): 1113-1122. 
 
Room, R. 2010. Cannabis policy: Moving beyond stalemate. Oxford University Press: 
New York. 
 
Roy, S. 2000. “Strategic segmentation of a market”, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 18(8): 1279-1290. 
 
Royne, M. B.; Fox, A. K.; Deitz, G. D.; Gibson, T. 2014. “The effects of health 
consciousness and familiarity with DTCA on perceptions of dietary supplements”, 
The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 48(3): 515-34. 
 
Sabet, K. 2012. “Much ado about nothing: Why rescheduling won’t solve advocates’ 
medical marijuana problem”, Wayne Law Review, 58(81): 81-101. 
 
Sax, J. K. 2015. “Dietary supplements are not all safe and not all food: How the low cost 
of dietary supplements preys on the consumer”, American Journal of Law & 
Medicine, 41(2): 374-94. 
 
Scherer, F. M. 2004. “The pharmaceutical industry—prices and progress”, The New 
England Journal of Medicine, 351(9): 927-32. 
 
Schmalensee, R. 1982. “Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands”, The 
American Economic Review, 72(3): 349-65. 
 
Schneider, D. 2014. “Pot economics: what’s the future of the American marijuana 
market?”, Dollars and Sense, 311: 11-16. 
 
Shanahan, M.; Ritter, A. 2014. “Cost benefit analysis of two policy options for cannabis: 
status quo and legalization.” PLOSone. doi: 10.1371/jounal.pone.0095569. 
 
Starr, R. R. 2015. “Too little, too late: Ineffective regulation of dietary supplements in the 
United States”, American Journal of Public Health, 105(3): 478-85. 
 
Stigler, G. J. 1955. “Introduction”, NBER Business Concentration and Price, Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, N.J. 
 
Stott, G. C. 2004. “Cannabinoids for the pharmaceutical industry”, Euphytica, 140(1): 
83-93. 
 
Tesler, L. G.; Best, W.; Egan, J. W.; Higinbotham, H. N. 1975. “The theory of supply 
with applications to the ethical pharmaceutical industry”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 18(2): 449-78. 
 
72 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 502. 2001. 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. 1932. (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 




Varian, H. 1996. “Differential pricing and efficiency”, First Monday, 1(2): doi: 
10.5210/fm.v1i2.473. 
 
Vialpando v. Ben’s Automotive Services and Redwood Fire & Casualty, No. 32,920. 
2014. 
 
Wallace, A. 2016. “Patent no. 6,630,507: Why the U.S. government holds a patent on 




Washington Intsitute for Public Policy. 2013. “I-502 evaluation plan and preliminary 




Zaric, G. S. 2008. “Optimal drug pricing, limited use conditions and stratified net benefits 
for Markov models of disease progression”, Health Economics, 17(11): 1277-94. 
 
 
